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Abstract: Ensuring communications security in Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) indeed is critical; due to the criticality of the 
resources in the sensor nodes as well as due to their ubiquitous and 
pervasive deployment, with varying attributes and degrees of 
security required. The proliferation of the next generation sensor 
nodes, has not solved this problem, because of the greater 
emphasis on low-cost deployment.  
In addition, the WSNs use data-centric multi-hop 
communication that in turn, necessitates the security support to be 
devised at the link layer (increasing the cost of security related 
operations), instead of being at the application layer, as in general 
networks. Therefore, an energy-efficient link layer security 
framework is necessitated. There do exists a number of link layer 
security architectures that offer some combinations of the security 
attributes desired by different WSN applications.  
However, as we show in this paper, none of them is responsive 
to the actual security demands of the applications. Therefore, we 
believe that there is a need for investigating the feasibility of a 
configurable software-based link layer security architecture 
wherein an application can be compiled flexibly, with respect to its 
actual security demands.  
In this paper, we analyze, propose and experiment with the 
basic design of such configurable link layer security architecture 
for WSNs. We also experimentally evaluate various aspects related 
to our scheme viz. configurable block ciphers, configurable block 
cipher modes of operations, configurable MAC sizes and 
configurable replay protection.  The architecture proposed is aimed 
to offer the optimal level of security at the minimal overhead, thus 
saving the precious resources in the WSNs.   
 
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Link Layer Security, 
Encryption, Authentication, Replay Protection.  
 
1. Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) comprise of the 
networked wireless sensor nodes to realize some vital 
functionality. Some of the example applications of WSNs 
are environmental parameter monitoring (flood, water level, 
temperature, stress, strain, pressure etc), industrial 
automation in hostile environments, tracking movements of 
living beings in parks, sanctuaries, offices, schools, banks 
etc, surveillance in war zones, enemy camps and a host of 
others [1][2]. Irrespective of the applications for which the 
WSNs are deployed, the security of the network nodes by 
themselves and that of the data collected and disseminated 
by them is of prime concern [2][3]. 
Wireless sensor nodes are characterized by severe 
constraints in power, computational resources, memory, and 
bandwidth and have small physical size with low power 
consumption [1][2]. On the other hand, using the security 
protocols always entails additional overhead on the 
computational, storage and energy resources. Therefore, 
ensuring security in WSNs requires adapting the 
conventional security protocols to the resource constrained 
WSN environments, with minimal overhead.  
In addition, it is a fact that unconditional security is not 
possible in practice, even in the resource rich, conventional 
networks [4]. Therefore, the security protocols therein, have 
always been designed to offer computational security only. 
Computational security is based on either the intractability 
of solving a particular computational problem or on 
ensuring that the computational complexity of the security 
algorithm is too high to enable it to be broken, within 
reasonable time and within the available resources [4]. 
Therefore, the security protocols in conventional networks 
are designed to operate and be safe, within the precincts of 
the available resources on the target platform, only.  
Now, in order to have confidence in computational 
security, the conventional security protocols are inherently 
designed with higher computational, storage and energy 
resource overheads [5]. Such higher overheads are tolerable 
by the resource-rich Personal Computers, but may not be 
tolerable by the resource-starved sensor nodes. Therefore, in 
the WSNs, due to the low resources, it is even more essential 
to ensure that the associated overhead due to the security 
protocols is at the minimum.  
In addition to the above-mentioned facts, the 
communication paradigm followed in WSNs is data-centric 
multi-hop communication, instead of the route-centric 
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multi-hop communication used in the conventional 
networks. The data-centric multi-hop communication is 
characterized by the in-network processing. In-network 
processing is based on data fusion that involves on the fly 
aggregation, summarization, or duplicate elimination of the 
data collected from different sensor nodes [1][2]. Since the 
processing of the data is done on-the-fly, the overall 
communication costs are reduced [1]. However, the fall-out 
of this is that with multi-hop communication and the in-
network processing demanding applications, the 
conventional end-to-end security mechanisms alone are not 
sufficient for the WSN [3]. This means that the direct 
applications of the protocols like IPSec [6], TLS [7] SSL [8] 
in WSNs is obviated.  
Therefore, the security protocols in the WSNs have to be 
devised at the link layer to support secure data fusion [3] 
[9]. In the link layer security protocols, because the security 
related operations are carried out at every hop, the overhead 
due to the same further increases [3]. Hence, these protocols 
have to be designed carefully to reduce the overhead to the 
extent possible.  
In order to investigate whether the overhead can 
somehow be optimized or not, it is necessary to identify 
what specific link layer security attributes are desired and 
whether any refinement is possible with respect to each one 
of them or not. We discuss in the next section, how in 
attempt to improve the resource overhead in relation to the 
security attributes desired, the notion of the configurable 
security attributes is useful.    
1.1 Motivation  
The security attributes that any link layer security 
protocol must offer are data confidentiality (mechanism: 
data encryption), data integrity and data-origin 
authentication (mechanism: keyed hash functions) and data 
freshness with protection against replay attacks 
(mechanism: an appropriate anti-replay algorithm). 
However, not all the sensor network applications demand 
all of these attributes. Well, we observed earlier, that the 
WSNs are deployed for a wide and diverse spectrum of 
applications. Therefore, there are wide variations in the 
security demands of various applications, too. Hence, it is 
essential to identify the classes of WSN applications that 
demand similar security attributes.  
In [10], we elaborately survey a wide cross-section of live 
WSN applications that have diverse demands for security, 
using which we propose a security attributes driven 
taxonomy of WSN applications. We use the proposed 
taxonomy as the basis, to analyze the level and the types of 
security attributes desired in each category of applications.  
In addition, from the survey of the types of the existing 
WSN nodes and their configurations, we realize that the 
available resources in the sensor nodes also vary a lot. For 
example the Berkeley Mica2 [11] motes, released first in 
2004, have 128 KB of program memory and 4 KB of RAM 
whereas the Crossbow iMote2 motes released in 2007  have 
256kB SRAM, 32MB flash memory and  32MB of SDRAM 
[12].  
Hence, we primarily conclude that the link layer security 
architecture in WSNs must be responsive to the application 
environment under consideration. This means that it should 
be flexible and configurable.  
 Unfortunately, our investigation reveals that the 
existing attempts at providing software-based link layer 
security support viz. SPINS [13], TinySec [14], SenSec [15],  
and MiniSec [16] assume abstract security models of the 
WSN deployment that are not completely sensitive to the 
actual security demands of the target applications. 
Therefore, these frameworks do not allow configurability in 
tuning the type and level of the security attributes for an 
application to help minimize the resource overhead.  
Alternately, the necessary link layer security support may 
be provided by the underlying hardware based on IEEE 
802.15.4 specification [17][18]. However, using a hardware-
based solution lacks flexibility and does not provide the 
transparent security enablement for the existing WSN 
applications [19].  
 Therefore, we propose here, model of a flexible link 
layer security architecture viz. FlexiSec. We attempt to 
make the model configurable by providing various security 
attributes driven alternatives to the application designer, to 
enable the optimal target code for the application under 
consideration, to be generated.  
We arrive at the configuration of each such security 
attributes driven alternative in the proposed model, by 
investigating the type and the level of security attributes, 
that alternative is aimed to offer. In order to support our 
design, we implement and analyze the alternative 
configurations therein and show that our design performs 
better than the contemporary architectures.  
To be specific, our experimentations and analyses are 
done with respect to the overhead associated with various 
block ciphers, the block cipher modes of operations, the 
message authentication code sizes, and the replay 
protection algorithms. In the next section, we present an 
overview of the specific research issues that helped us in 
arriving at the configuration of our proposed model; with 
proper justification that made us focus on those issues. 
1.2 Scope of Work 
The link layer security architecture that we propose here 
viz. FlexiSec is aimed to offer configurable security with 
respect to the following aspects.   
(a) First, our proposed framework allows application 
designer tune the desired security attributes necessary for an 
application. The proposed framework is aimed to support 
either message/entity authentication or a combination of 
confidentiality and authentication or that of confidentiality, 
authentication, and replay protection along with flexible 
selection of MAC sizes. Such flexibility is necessary with 
respect to the diverse security demands of the WSN 
applications, as illustrated in [10].  
As for example, with the combined Authenticated-
Encryption technique that the Output Codebook Mode 
(OCB) [20], the Counter with Cipher Block Chaining 
Message Authentication Code (CCM) Mode [21] and the 
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Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [22] follow, the applications 
demanding the message confidentiality as well as data 
integrity, are more efficient to implement, as compared to 
the same using the conventional modes. This is so, because 
the conventional modes like Cipher Block Chaining Mode 
[23] are designed to support confidentiality and not message 
integrity check. Hence, the message integrity check 
algorithm like CBC-MAC [24] is required to be employed 
separately, resulting into increased overall overhead.  
On the other hand, if the security architecture employs 
only the Authenticated Encryption (AE) modes of operation, 
then the applications demanding only authentication may 
not be implemented as efficiently, as with the conventional    
CBC-MAC mechanism. 
(b) Next, we propose that in the link layer security 
framework employed, the strength of the cipher used must 
be commensurate with the resource overhead entailed and 
the security level desired. We emphasize that the confidence 
in a security protocol is largely derived from that in the 
cipher. At the same time, the total overhead associated with 
the use of such a protocol is also largely due to the intrinsic 
design of the cipher and due to the cipher parameters viz. 
the key-size, block-size and the number of rounds.  
Therefore, instead of merely using a cipher just because it 
is accepted as an advanced standard, it is essential to 
examine whether any other lightweight cipher, operating 
without any compromise on the necessary cipher parameters 
(beginning with the key-size), can be feasibly employed or 
not.  
Based on our experiments carried out to measure the 
overhead associated, we prescribe two ciphers at two 
extremes; yet offering the security strength due to 128-bit 
key-size. The prescribed ciphers are the AES cipher 
Rijndael [25] and an optimized version of lightweight cipher 
Corrected Block Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XXTEA) [26]. 
As part of our experimentation, we propose two optimized 
versions of the AES viz. a speed optimized and a size 
optimized version, too.  
We again emphasize that the availability of multiple 
configurable options to the application programmer, enables 
him/her to compile an application with the optimal 
alternatives depending upon the availability of the resources 
and the security demands of the application; thereby tuning 
the optimum level of security, at the minimal overhead.  
(c) Next, again with an aim to reduce the resource 
overhead, we propose that the size of the Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) employed must be 
commensurate with the packet transmission rate of the 
application under consideration. The current link layer 
security architectures [14][15][16] employ 4-byte MAC. We 
consider varying MAC sizes of 4 bytes or 8 bytes, based on 
the security attributes driven taxonomy of WSN applications 
[10] as before.  
(d) Lastly, we show that a simple Bloom-filter based anti-
replay technique for supporting link layer replay protection 
as we proposed in [27] is useful for FlexiSec; as compared to 
the conventional methods for implementing replay 
protection [28].  
Hence, the innovative approach in our solution will offer 
the following benefits as compared to the peer link layer 
security frameworks for WSNs:   
• Our proposed framework has configurable and flexible 
security features that can be tailored to the needs of the 
application under consideration. 
• It can be used as a ready-to-use experimental test-bed 
for security related experimentations in WSNs.  
• It can offer seamless migration of legacy applications to 
make them security enabled such that there is no need 
for separate API calls to be made to use the security 
features.  
As has been the test-bed for our experimentations, the 
proposed security architecture is also intended to be 
integrated with the TinyOS [29] environment. However, it 
can be extended for any other alternate platform.  
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt at 
proposing a model of configurable link layer security 
architecture that employs and evaluates the XXTEA and the 
AES ciphers in the CBC, OCB and CCM block cipher 
modes as well as proposes a simple Bloom filter based 
replay protection algorithm for unicast communications 
[28][27] .  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 
we survey the existing software based link layer security 
architectures. In section 3, we describe the characteristics of 
the ciphers and the modes of operations used by us for 
evaluation.   In section 4, we present a survey of the 
conventional approaches for ensuring replay protection in 
WSNs and the Bloom filter based approach for replay 
protection along with our design. In section 5, we discuss 
our methodology of evaluation and the experimental setup. 
In section 6, we present the results and analyze them 
whereas in section 7, we discuss the proposed model of the 
FlexiSec architecture. We conclude with the plan for the 
further work in section 8. 
2. Link Layer Security Architectures  
In this section, we present a survey of the existing link 
layer security architectures. There indeed have been a 
significant number of attempts published in the literature, 
aimed at enriching the link layer protocols in WSNs, with 
the essential security mechanisms.   
Karlof et al present TinySec [14] as a lightweight and 
efficient link-layer security protocol for WSNs. It is the first 
link layer security architecture implemented in software. 
TinySec attempts to provide at least minimal configurable 
link layer security, with three different modes of operations. 
These operation mode provide either (a) no security support 
or (b) support for message authentication only based on 
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code 
(CBC-MAC) [24] viz. TinySec_Auth or (c) support for (b) 
and message confidentiality via encryption in Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC) mode [23] viz. TinySec_AE mode.  
The designers of TinySec emphasize that protection 
against replay attacks need not be built-in at the link layer. 
Therefore, there is no mode of operation that offers such 
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selection. 
Architecturally, TinySec also aims to employ a plug-and-
play design to make it possible to alter the basic building 
blocks of the security architecture i.e. the cipher employed 
or the cipher mode of operation used. However, we 
experienced that factually, such alteration requires 
significant changes to the underlying TinySec code. As for 
example though it is easy to use a 128-bit key-sized cipher 
by merely changing a few lines in the TinySec configuration 
file viz. TinySecC.nc,  employing a 128-bit block sized 
cipher requires a careful understanding of the TinySec 
architecture and substantial cryptic changes to various other 
implementation modules.  
TinySec employs 64-bit block-sized and 80-bit key-sized 
Skipjack [30], as the default block cipher. The authors of 
TinySec also discuss the experimental evaluation of the 
encumbered 128-bit key-sized and 64-bit RC5 block cipher 
[31].  
SenSec is another attempt at designing the link layer 
security framework for specific body monitoring application 
at the Institute of Infocomm Research, Singapore. Thus, it 
cannot be employed as a platform for further cryptographic 
experimentations. It also uses Skipjack as the block cipher 
but with modified XCBC [32] mode of operation. Being 
modeled highly on the design of TinySec, SenSec too does 
not support replay protection. TinySec and SenSec are 
devised for security support in only unicast communication 
mode. 
Mark Luk et al in [16] present a recent attempt at 
designing the link layer security architecture that is 
designed for the Telos motes [33]. MiniSec uses a different 
approach in that it offers two operating modes, one tailored 
for single-source unicast communication, whereas the other, 
for multi-source broadcast communication. It offers all the 
basic desired link layer security properties viz. data 
encryption, message integrity and replay protection. 
MiniSec also uses Skipjack as the block cipher.  
However, MiniSec offers no configurability with respect 
to the security attributes, offering only AE block cipher 
mode of operation. Thus, applications demanding only 
message or entity authentication cannot be optimally 
implemented in MiniSec. Neither does MiniSec offer any 
choice in selection of cipher as well as the selection of the 
MAC sizes.  
Alternatively, the link layer security support may be 
provided using a protocol confirming to the IEEE 802.15.4 
specification [17].  One of the protocols confirming to the 
IEEE 802.15.4 standard, is the ZigBee protocol [34]. ZigBee 
is a specification, targeted at RF applications that require a 
low data rate, long battery life, and secure networking. 
However, the use of ZigBee protocol involves appropriate 
licensing and membership of the ZigBee Consortium. In 
addition, ZigBee has been labeled as a protocol offering high 
security at high overhead in [16] and hence suitable for the 
higher end PAN devices and not the low end WSN nodes. 
This is factually reflected in its cipher specification – all of 
the modes in IEEE 802.15.4 specification are based on the 
AES Rijndael cipher that indeed - with all improved and 
optimized versions – is still an expensive cipher. In 
addition, the IEEE 802.15.4 specification offers a mode that 
offers only data encryption using Counter mode [23]. With 
any encryption of the data without message authentication 
labeled as being useless, the limitations of such a mode of 
operation have well been discussed in [35]. 
As compared to these solutions, the design that we 
propose here is better due to the following reasons: 
(a) In FlexiSec model, we make a provision for three 
different optimized versions of two different ciphers. The 
ciphers we have selected are the AES and the XXTEA 
cipher. Our results indeed show that the XXTEA cipher can 
be a better choice for those environments where the 
available storage is limited, whereas the optimized versions 
of the AES cipher are better otherwise.  
(b) We also provide configurable selection of either the 
conventional CBC-MAC for ensuring authentication only or 
the efficient OCB Authenticated Encryption block cipher 
mode of operation for ensuring confidentiality as well as 
integrity in FlexiSec. 
(c) FlexiSec also caters to the selection of variable MAC 
sizes that are responsive to the application needs and 
hardware used. 
(d) FlexiSec also has the provision of a simple and 
efficient replay protection schemes.  
(e) FlexiSec explicitly omits the insecure block cipher 
modes of operation that are specified in IEEE 802.15.4 
standard viz. the Counter mode without authentication 
support.  
(f) In FlexiSec, we also make the provision of an option 
for non-keyed authentication support as well as the 
provision of security support being derived from hardware 
too.  
We discuss the detailed model of FlexiSec in section 7.  
3. Block Ciphers and Modes for FlexiSec 
We now discuss the characteristics of the block ciphers 
and the cipher modes of operation that we believe can be 
used as potential candidates in the link layer security 
architecture FlexiSec. We observe that in our process of 
selecting and/or optimizing the selected cipher and the 
cipher mode of operation for the link layer security 
architectures, it is necessary to look for any peer attempts to 
do so.  
This is so because instead of reinventing the wheel, we 
could then use the same results for our architecture. Hence, 
in section 3.3, we discuss the related work attempted at 
evaluation of the block ciphers and the modes in the WSN 
environment and justify how our approach here, is different 
from the contemporary ones.  
3.1 The Block Ciphers  
We attempt the evaluation of the AES cipher Rijndael, 
the XXTEA cipher, RC6 [36] and the Skipjack cipher. Our 
aim is to identify different possible candidate ciphers to 
comply with the nature of the application under 
consideration and the available resources. Hence, we 
compared the performance of the AES, RC6 and XXTEA 
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against that of Skipjack and tried to justify as to how 
amongst the ciphers with the key-size of 128-bits, AES and 
XXTEA can be used as two suitable candidates. As 
mentioned earlier, we also optimize the AES and the 
XXTEA ciphers for the link layer security architecture for 
the WSNs. 
Our baseline cipher for evaluation is Skipjack, since it is 
the cipher of choice, in all the existing software based link 
layer security architectures. Skipjack uses 80-bit key with a 
64-bit block size and 32 rounds of an unbalanced Feistel 
network. The cipher was declassified in 1998 with an aim to 
replace then standard cipher viz. the DES [37]. The best 
cryptanalytic attack against the cipher was carried out on its 
31 of the 32 rounds, employing differential cryptanalysis 
[38].   
However, we attempted exploring whether 80-bit key-size 
of Skipjack can be considered sufficient today?  Although 
the strength of a cipher is a complex measure of the cipher 
function, key-size and the block-size, we believe that the size 
of the cipher key is primarily an indicative measure of the 
strength of the computational security of the cipher. The 
cipher key-size must be sufficient enough to prevent the 
brute force attack against the cipher. Hence, we attempted to 
analyze the justification for the 80-bit key-size,  as we 
discuss below. 
In [39], Lenstra attempts to quantify the security of a 
cryptosystem with respect to its key length in terms of the 
trust in the Data Encryption Standard [38] cipher. DES was 
first introduced in 1977 and then was reviewed every five 
years. Thus, it was trusted at least till 1982. Lenstra 
proposes that the security of DES in 1982 be treated as the 
base security to calculate the security margin y of any other 
cipher. Assuming k as the key-size required to carry out the 
best known attack against a cipher A, the number of years 
till the cipher A can be considered secure i.e. the security 
margin y of the cipher A can be defined as  
                      
23
30)56(1982 −+= ky                   (1) 
IF y is known i.e. the year up to which the cipher is 
required to be secure, the minimum required k can be found 
out. If calculated in this manner, the 80-bit key-sized cipher 
can be considered as safe until 2013 and a 128-bit key-size 
cipher, until 2076. 
However, this hypothesis was given by Lenstra in 2001. 
The recent recommendations portray a very different 
picture. As per the claims of RSA Security Labs, 80-bit keys 
would become crackable by 2010 [40]. In addition, we 
found a conservative prescription by ECRYPT [41] that 
dictates a minimal of 128-bits keys be used, for any cipher.  
In the Table-I below we show the prescribed key-sizes by 
ECRYPT, NIST [42], NSA[43], and RFC3766 [44].  
Table 1      Cipher Key-sizes 
Organization
/Method 
Desirable 
SKC key-
size in bits 
Desirable PKC 
key-size in bits  
Secure till 
year 
ECRYPT 128 3248 2029 
NIST 128 3072 2030 
NSA 128 - - 
RFC 3766 128 3253 - 
 
From this discussion, we conclude that it is necessary to 
look for a 128-bit key-sized cipher even for the low-resource 
WSN environments. We have considered three categories of 
candidate ciphers with 128-bit key-size.  
First, we have selected AES because it is the current 
cipher standard. The AES cipher follows the                   
substitution-permutation network structure.  Next, we 
selected RC6 because it was one of the candidate cipher for 
the Advanced Encryption Standard selection and has been 
used as a cipher suitable for embedded systems in [45]. On 
the other hand, in the lookout for 128-bit key-sized 
lightweight ciphers, we tried selecting a cipher from the 
Tiny Encryption Algorithm family.  
The TEA (Tiny Encryption Algorithm) [46] cipher is a 
64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key-size and 64 rounds of 
operation. It is a short Feistel iteration cipher with no preset 
tables, nor any explicit key mixing routines. The 64 rounds 
of Feistel operations are based on the expressions viz. 
 
])3[)5(()(])2[4(
])1[)5(()(])0[4(
2)15( 31
keyRHsumRHkeyRHLHLH
keyLHsumLHkeyLHRHRH
sumsum
+>>⊕+⊕+<<+=
+<<⊕+⊕+<<+=
−+=
 
The key mixing operation in TEA uses addition and a 
golden number delta given by  
 312)15( −  
whereas the second and the third expressions show the 
Feistel functions of the cipher.  
Various cryptanalytic attacks on TEA have been reported 
in the literature. Biryukov and Wagner exposed the slide 
attack on TEA in [47],  whereas Kesley in [48] exposed the 
reduced key strength of the cipher due to the equivalent 
keys. 
Hernandez et al. in [49] showed that, it is possible to find 
the distinguisher for TEA with only 2115 chosen plaintexts 
and five rounds, using genetic algorithms. Moon et al in 
[50] show that with 252.5 chosen plain texts and 284 
encryptions, it is possible to attack an 11-round TEA with 
impossible differentials. In [51], Seokhie Hong use the 
truncated differentials of probability 1 to attack a 17-round 
TEA with 1920 chosen plain texts that improves on the 
previous attacks. 
Needham et al. in [52] propose the XTEA cipher, to 
overcome the limitations of TEA, specifically the related key 
attack. However, XTEA is shown to be more vulnerable to 
differential and truncated differential attacks in [51].  
Wheeler et al. then propose in [26] the Corrected Block 
TEA cipher (XXTEA) as an improvement over Block TEA. 
XXTEA also uses 128-bit key-sizes with a Feistel network 
design and variable 6 to 32 rounds depending on the block 
size.  
No major published cryptanalytic weaknesses of XXTEA 
cipher are known. Therefore, we deduce that TEA and 
XTEA should not be adjudged as the lightweight cipher of 
choice for our framework. Hence, we selected the XXTEA 
cipher for our framework. We believe that because of its 
simplistic design, it ought to be appropriate for the resource 
constrained WSNs.  
(2) 
(3) 
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3.2 Block Cipher Modes of Operation  
We have also attempted the optimization and evaluation 
of the block cipher modes of operations. Commonly the 
block cipher modes of operation can be categorized as either 
Conventional mode or the Authenticated Encryption mode. 
The Cipher Block Chaining mode is the commonly used 
conventional mode of operation. The CBC mode encryption 
with the ciphertext block C, the plaintext block P, the cipher 
key K, the encryption function E and the initialization 
vector IV, is defined as [23]  
         1 0( ),i K i iC E P C C IV−= ⊕ =                   (4) 
whereas, the CBC mode decryption operation is defined as   
          1 0( ) ,i K i iP D C C C IV−= ⊕ =                      (5) 
The CBC mode necessitates that for every encryption 
round, the initialization vector must be unique in order to 
ensure semantic security.  In CBC, for an input message of 
N blocks, N block cipher calls are required only for ensuring 
confidentiality i.e. there is no computation of the MAC 
during the encryption round. The MAC can be computed 
using any other algorithm but normally, it is computed 
using the CBC-MAC [24] that is defined as, 
                 1 0( ), 0ni K i iC E P C C−= ⊕ =                  (6) 
Thus, in computation of MAC also, another N block 
cipher calls are required.  
In addition, since this is a separate call to the block 
cipher; different set of keys than the one used for computing 
the ciphertext (for confidentiality) are required here.  Thus, 
the total overhead not only increases because of the multiple 
calls to the block cipher but also due to the additional key 
management, required. 
As compared to the same, the Output Codebook Mode 
(OCB) [20], the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) [21] Mode 
and the Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [22] i.e. the 
Authenticated Encryption (AE) modes were proposed to 
lower the computational and storage costs. 
Phillip Rogaway et al. proposed the OCB mode in [20]. In 
this mode, the plaintext is encrypted to get the ciphertext 
and then the MAC (computed with a MAC computation 
routine) is appended at the end of the encrypted message in 
the form of a tag. The length of the tag controls the level of 
authentication.  
Formally, first in this mode, an offset or a random value 
is computed as  
                               (0 )bKO E=                                     (7) 
where O denotes the b-bit zero vector encrypted under the 
key K. OCB mode employs a nonce instead of an IV or a 
counter to randomize the encryption. If N denotes the nonce 
for a message  
1 2 3 4.... nM M M M M M=
, 
then the ith block Mi in OCB is encrypted as 
                   ( )K i i iE M O N O N⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕                     (8)  
whereas it computes the tag as  
              1( ..... )K i n n nE M M Y O N+⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕          (9) 
The OCB protocol requires two state variables. First, it 
employs a single cipher key K used for both encapsulation 
and decapsulation.  In addition, it uses a 28-bit packet 
sequence counter to construct the OCB mode nonce.  
For a message of N blocks, OCB requires 2 + N block 
cipher calls to encrypt the message as well as compute the 
tag, in a single invocation of the cryptosystem. Thus, the 
principal characteristics of OCB are in achieving optimal 
number of block cipher calls, parallelizable routines and the 
use of a single-key [20].  
Russ Housley, Doug Whiting and Niels Ferguson 
proposed the CCM mode in [21]. It is based on employing 
the cipher in the Counter mode of operation and then using 
the CBC-MAC for computing the MAC.  The CCM mode is 
less efficient than the OCB mode as it requires twice the 
number of block cipher calls, as required by the OCB mode. 
John Viega and David A. McGrew proposed the Galois 
Counter Mode as an improvement to Carter-Wegman 
Counter CWC mode (CWC) [53]. It is now recommended 
by the NIST as its latest standard [54].  
The GCM mode offers the triple benefits of being 
parallelizable in hardware and software, being able to 
authenticate the data beyond those, which are not encrypted 
(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)) 
as well as being patent free. It is specified to be used with 
128-bit ciphers only in general and with the AES cipher in 
particular, although the block size of the underlying cipher 
should not matter. We have implemented GCM not only 
with the AES versions but also with the 80-bit Skipjack 
cipher.    
The GCM mode dispels the CCM approach of combining 
an already existing encryption mode with an already 
existing message integrity check mechanism (result: two 
passes) albeit using a single key to offer authenticated 
encryption. It even does not use the inverse cipher function 
of the underlying cipher. GCM uses a conventional mode for 
encryption but uses the authentication by computing the 
MAC in the Galois field. It takes as input a block cipher key 
K, an initialization vector IV, a plaintext P, and any 
additional data A to be authenticated. In turn, it gives as 
output the ciphertext C, and an authentication tag T 
Albeit for the gain in performance that one obtains using 
the AE modes, it is emphasized that they are useful only 
when an application demands confidentiality as well as 
message integrity both. For those applications requiring only 
the message authentication and integrity, the AE modes are 
not useful. 
3.3 Related Work in Evaluation of Ciphers and Modes  
In general, the block ciphers used for evaluation in WSN 
environment are viz. RC5 [31], Skipjack [30], Rijndael [25], 
Twofish [55], KASUMI [56], Camellia [56], TEA [46].  
There have been many benchmarks and evaluation of the 
block ciphers for the WSNs as surveyed and discussed here.  
Law et al in [57], present a detailed evaluation of the 
block ciphers viz. Skipjack, RC5, RC6, MISTY1 [58], 
Rijndael, Twofish, KASUMI, and Camellia. The evaluation 
is based on security properties, storage and energy efficiency 
of the ciphers. The results prescribe Skipjack as a suitable 
cipher in low memory resources environment to offer low 
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security strength, MISTY1 as a suitable cipher for higher 
security strength and AES as a suitable cipher for the 
applications that necessitate highest speed of operation at 
higher demands for memory.    
However, their evaluation of the ciphers is not done 
within any link layer architecture, thus not accounting for 
any link layer framework overhead. In addition, no attempt 
has been made to optimize the cipher code – instead, simply 
the openSSL [59] versions of the ciphers are employed. 
Moreover, as against the recommendation of these results, 
RC5 has been reported to be having higher speed than AES 
in [60].  
In [61], Großshädl Johann et al attempt at energy 
evaluation of the software implementations of the block 
ciphers. The authors have considered the ciphers RC6 [36], 
Rijndael, Serpent [62], Twofish and XTEA. They have used 
the simulation for the StrongARM SA-1100 processor used 
principally in embedded systems like cell phones and PDAs.  
However, this evaluation is also not done within any link 
layer security framework; nor the actual deployment on the  
sensor nodes or any typical WSN platform has been done.   
In [63] Guimarães Germano et al. discuss another attempt 
at evaluating the security mechanisms in WSNs. They 
evaluate the ciphers viz. TEA, Skipjack and RC5 on the 
TinySec platform with the Mica2 motes. However, in this 
evaluation, the authors do not prescribe any specific cipher 
as a suitable cipher; nor do they consider vital ciphers like 
the AES and the XXTEA.  
In [64], Luo Xiaohua et al. evaluate the performance of 
ciphers viz. SEAL [65], RC4 [66], RC5, TEA by 
implementing the ciphers on the Mica2 motes. The 
evaluation claims that RC5 is not suited for the WSNs. 
However, as we do here, neither the AES optimization, nor 
the secure XXTEA (instead of TEA) implementation & 
optimization, have been attempted. 
In [67], Ganesan Prasanth et al. analyze and model the 
encryption overhead by estimating the execution time and 
memory occupancy for the encryption and message digest 
algorithms viz. RC4, IDEA[68], RC5, MD5[69], and SHA-
1[70] on various hardware platforms viz. Atmega 103, 
Atmega 128, Mitsubishi M16C/10, Intel StrongARM SA-
110, Intel XScale PXA250 and SUN UltraSPARC II 
processors. Thus, the focus in this research exercise is to 
evaluate the performance of various embedded hardware 
platforms using the ciphers as the basis, rather than 
evaluating the ciphers by themselves. Even otherwise, the 
vital ciphers like the AES, XXTEA, and Skipjack are not at 
all considered for evaluation. 
Hence, from the above we conclude that none of these 
research exercises focuses specifically on the block ciphers 
and block cipher modes in the link layer framework that we 
attempt here. These evaluations are not aimed at imparting 
flexibility to the link layer security architecture. The fallout 
of this fact is that none of the attempts considers the 
lightweight ciphers of the TEA family as well as the AES 
cipher for evaluations, nor is there any attempt at 
optimizing the implementations of these ciphers, to 
specifically prescribe the ciphers suitable in different 
environments.    
4. Replay Attacks and Anti-Replay Schemes 
As mentioned earlier, we believe that one of the vital 
attributes of a link layer security framework is the protection 
against replay attacks. Therefore, we analyzed, designed, 
implemented and investigated the conventional replay 
protection algorithms in WSN setup and came up with a 
simple yet efficient Bloom filter [28] based anti-replay 
algorithm as discussed in [27]. In this section, we analyze 
our replay protection algorithms, intended to be used in 
FlexiSec.  
4.1 Replay Attacks  
A replay attack occurs when an adversary captures a 
packet in one protocol run and replays it later, in some other 
protocol run. Formally, let a sender A, at time instant t1 has 
sent k packets in the set T, bearing sequence numbers viz.  
TSEQ = {SEQ1, SEQ2, SEQ3,……SEQk} 
An adversary orchestrates the replay attack, by capturing 
any of these packets during the transmission and replaying 
at an instant later than A.  
The protection against replay attacks can be devised by 
defining a temporal or causal relationship, between the 
properties of the message received at an instant and those of 
the messages received previously. Such relationship is 
exploited to define an anti-replay protocol to handle a replay 
attack.  
Various approaches based on the above are analyzed in 
[71], [72], [73], and [74]. We survey these with a detailed 
analysis in [27]. 
For FlexiSec, we design, implement and evaluate four 
different algorithms for replay protection viz. based on 
employing a Counter and a Hash function as state 
identifiers,   and a third based on employing a Bloom filter 
for detecting replays. We discuss the design, and 
implementation of the same in [27].  Here, with the focus on 
FlexiSec design, we show the results obtained to justify the 
selection of Bloom filter based algorithm for FlexiSec. 
4.1.2  Replay protection in WSNs 
As discussed earlier, the existing  attempts at devising 
link layer security framework in the WSNs are the SPINS 
[13], TinySec [14], SenSec [15], and MiniSec [16].  
SNEP as part of SPINS achieves replay protection by 
keeping a consistent counter between the sender and 
receiver. However, as we show in our evaluation, a counter 
based approach is grossly inefficient in WSNs.  
The designers of TinySec do not consider replay 
protection as desirable at the link layer. They affirm that the 
replay protection ought to be the responsibility of the 
application layer.  
However, as we analyze in [27], with application layer 
replay protection, a replayed packet injected into a WSN 
may travel through many hops before being detected at the 
destination. This would waste the precious resources in 
sensor nodes. Hence, it is essential to provide replay 
protection at the link layer itself.  
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MiniSec is a secure link layer protocol that serves to 
provide, according to its designers, low energy consumption 
and high security. MiniSec provides two different strategies 
for anti-replay for its two different operating modes.   
For the unicast mode, a synchronized counter based 
approach is proposed. However, such scheme is not scalable 
with the increase in the number of nodes in the network. In 
addition, it requires costly resynchronization routines to be 
executed, when the counters shared, are desynchronized due 
to the out-of-order delivery of the packets. As against that, 
our sliding window based counter approach does not require 
any resynchronization to be done although it is not scalable, 
as in MiniSec.  
To handle scalability concerns, MiniSec indeed employs a 
Bloom Filter based approach with sliding window (in 
broadcast setup). However, our solution against replays is a 
simpler one, being applicable in a unicast setup in WSNs.  
4.2 Our Design 
In this section, we illustrate and analyze how our Bloom 
filter based algorithm is efficient and scalable as compared 
to the conventional approaches.  
As mentioned earlier, using a counter value as the 
message tag is one of the most common approaches for 
detecting packet replays. However, when we use a counter-
based algorithm, we have to devise a suitable data structure 
to maintain the counter value and incorporate it as one of 
the data packet component.  
 
DEST 
(2) 
AM 
(1) 
LEN 
(1) 
SRC 
(2) 
CTR 
(2) 
Data 
(0..29) 
MAC 
(4) 
Figure 1.  TinySec_AE Packet Format [14] 
In the TinySec packet format as shown in Fig. 1, a 
counter (CTR) indeed is used by its designers for framing 
the Initialization Vector. Therefore, TinySec can easily be 
augmented with replay protection using the CTR for the 
purpose. The counter-based algorithm for replay protection 
is shown in Fig. 2.  
Algorithm 
CounterReplayDetect(CounterReceived, 
                                   NodeID) 
{ 
1.  id = o; 
2.  for id = 1 to lastValidId { 
3.   if (id==NodeID) { 
4.    if (CounterReceived <=  
                        LastCount[NodeID]) 
5.    replayed = 1; 
      else  
6.    replayed = 0; 
7.   LastCount[NodeID]=CounterReceived; 
     } 
   } 
} 
Figure 2. Antireplay algorithm using a CTR [IJCS] 
However, in a typical WSN, each sensor node will have to 
maintain the counter value for all the other (n-1) nodes in 
the network. Thereby, the total storage expended turns out 
to be  
n(n-1) * bytes_per_counter_value   (10) 
 Therefore, this approach is not scalable and can be 
employed only for small size networks.  
However, this approach does not require counter 
resynchronization as in SNEP or in MiniSec unicast 
approach. The counter value required for replay protection 
is part of IV, so there is no extra overhead in packet size 
involved for this method. Hence, the method incurs very less 
consumption in radio energy. 
Unlike the previous approach, in the hash-function based 
algorithm, a hash value generated by a hash function, can be 
used as a type tag to maintain the state information required 
for detecting replays. A standard hash function like SHA-1 
[70] can be used for the purpose. However, SHA-1 hash 
function and hence this algorithm entails lots of resource 
overhead, as we illustrate through our experimental results.  
As compared, the Bloom filter [28] based algorithm, 
which uses a bloom filter with hash functions, is scalable as 
well as efficient.  
The Bloom filter is a special compact data structure used 
for probabilistic representation of a set so as to 
probabilistically answer membership queries about the 
elements of the set.  The Bloom filter uses a Bloom filter 
vector as the representative of the data set. The contents of 
the Bloom filter vector are determined by the application of 
the hash functions on the input data element. That is, the 
hash values generated upon the application of hash 
functions to a data item, are treated as different addresses in 
the Bloom filter vector, the contents of which are set to a 1, 
to designate the presence of the corresponding data item.  
Formally, a Bloom filter is a vector of n bits consisting of 
each individually addressable cells viz. a1, a2, a3, a4…..an 
along with m different hash functions viz.  h1, h2, 
h3,……….hm. Initially, the Bloom filter is empty with all its 
bits set to 0.  
To add the information about a data element, say di, to 
the Bloom filter, each of the hash functions hj,  1<=j<=m is 
applied on di to get the corresponding hash values hvj. The 
vector addresses indexed by hvj in the Bloom filter vector 
are then set to 1. 
Subsequently, to query for the membership of a data 
element di, the data element is again hashed with m hash 
functions to get the m different hash values viz. hv1, hv2, 
hv3,……….hvm. Whether an element is a member of the set 
or not is determined as per the algorithm in Fig. 3. 
In using the above approach for replay detection, when a 
packet is first received by a node, the message freshness 
identifier (tag) in the packet is hashed by the m hash 
functions as before, and the bits in the Bloom vector are set. 
If these bit values are 1, then the packet is a replayed packet, 
otherwise it is not, as illustrated in the algorithm in Fig. 3.  
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Algorithm MembershipTests(DataItem ai, 
    BloomFilter vector, Set HashFunctions) 
{ 
1.  for HF = 1 to m { 
2.    if (vector[HashFunctionsHF(a)] != 1)  
3.     return NonReplay;  
4.  } 
5.  return Replay; 
} 
Figure 3. Generic Algorithm using Bloom filter 
4.3 False Positives in Bloom filter 
Bloom filter based replay protection algorithm may suffer 
from false positives. That is, even if a packet is not a 
replayed packet, it may be tagged as a replayed one.  
Let the size of Bloom filter vector be m and there be k 
hash functions, in use. Then, the probability that any one of 
the location in the vector not being set by any one hash 
function is given by P’ 
                              
1
' 1P
m
= −                                  (11) 
When employing k hash functions, the same will be 
                         
1
' 1
k
P
m
  
= −   
  
                         (12) 
If there were in all n elements, then the probability for a 
certain bit to be still not set would be given by 
                               
1
' 1
k n
P
m
  
= −   
  
                           (13) 
Then, the probability P that the bit is set will be given by  
                              
11 1
k n
P
m
 
= − − 
 
                           (14) 
Thus, when carrying out the set membership tests, for the 
data item that is already in the set, the expression (14) above 
can be used. However, for a data item that is not in the set, 
the set membership tests must return test above as 0. If we 
assume that, the set membership test, erroneously returns 
the same element to be actually present in the set, it would 
be so only if each of the k hash functions, yield the same 
value to be 1. That is the probability for a false positive can 
be derived from expression (14) as  
         
False PositiveP − = 11 1
kk n
m
  
− −     
                    (15) 
          1False Positive
kkn
mP e−
− 
= − 
 
                        (16) 
                                      
1
2k
≈                                (17) 
In general, to prevent false positives, the Bloom filter 
design criterion specifies tuning k i.e. the number of hash 
functions.  
Our Bloom filter based algorithm for replay protection 
employs eight hash functions. We show our improved 
version of the algorithm (as compared to the one in [27]) 
using eight hash functions in Fig. 4. 
In this algorithm, we use bloom filter with eight 32-bit 
hash functions i.e. theoretically 232 different values per hash 
function. Thus, the false positive rate in our approach turns 
out to be 1/256 i.e. 0.00390.  The eight hash functions that 
we have employed are from the family of universal hash 
functions, requiring lesser computational overhead than 
SHA-1 viz. RSHash, JSHash, PJWHash, ELPHash, 
BKDRHash, SDBMHash, DJBHash, DEKHash, and 
APHash. We carefully implement the bloom filter as two-
dimensional vector in order to implement it, optimally. 
5. Experimental Setup 
In this section we describe the tools and the platform used 
by us for the experiments conducted as well as the 
methodology adopted and the test application used to do so.  
5.1   Platforms and Tools used  
We have used the TinySec link layer security framework in 
the TinyOS 1.1x operating environment [29] with the nesC 
[75] as the language of implementation. We have also 
employed TOSSIM simulator [76] to first simulate our code 
and subsequently deploy the code on the Mica2 sensor 
nodes. We have exploited the TinyOS support for the 
deployment of the code on the Mica2 motes. 
Although TOSSIM captures TinyOS behavior at very low 
level, it does not model the power consumption for the 
motes. This is because it does not model the CPU execution 
time, and thus, cannot provide accurate information for 
calculating the CPU energy consumption.  
Hence, we are using AVRORA [77] to measure the CPU 
cycles and power consumption for a particular node. Avrora 
is an emulator implemented in Java that runs the actual 
Mica code, while emulating each WSN node as its own 
thread.  
Having implemented the ciphers, modes and the replay 
protection schemes in nesC and plugged them in the 
TinySec framework, our evaluation in general consists of 
three different stages, as follows: 
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Algorithm ReplayBloomFilter8(Packet In,Set 
   HashFunction,int n, Filter BloomFilter) 
{ 
1. if (!FilterCreated) { 
2. Filter CreateBloomFilter (set A, Set 
    HashFunctions, integer n, BloomFilter                                            
                             BloomVector) 
3.     FilterCreated=1; 
 } 
4. for each received packet { 
5.   for i = 1 to k { 
6.      
 HashValue=ApplyHashi(TypeTag(Packet In)) 
7.    if (BloomVector[HashValue] == 1) 
8.     replayed=1; 
9.   else  
10.    replayed=0;   
11.    BloomVector[HashValue] = 1; 
12.    exit(); 
     } 
  } 
13. if (replayed == 1)  
14.  return (replayedpacket=1) 
15. else { 
16.  return (replayedpacket=0); 
}   
   } 
  
Figure 4. Antireplay Algorithm ReplayBloomFilter8 
(a) First, we evaluate the performance in TinyOS 
environment with TOSSIM as the WSN simulator. The 
nesC compiler itself gives as output the RAM and ROM 
requirements of the application under consideration as part 
of the compilation process that helps us in determining the 
storage requirement. 
 (b) Next, we use the Avrora simulator to determine the 
throughput in bits/sec and the energy consumed. For the 
purpose, we converted the executable file generated by 
Mica2 compilation into ELF file format and then simulated 
it in AVRORA by setting the appropriate flag monitors. We 
measured throughput according to following formulae with 
the clock speed of 8 MHz.  
 
( _ * ) /Throughput Message size CPUClockSpeed NoofCycles=  
(18)  
To measure the energy consumption, we follow the same 
method as for CPU cycle measurement again using the 
appropriate flags in Avrora. The total simulation time was 
set to 100 seconds. We obtain the CPU and radio energy 
consumption for each mote and normalize the same, for 
evaluation. 
(c) Third, we deploy the application under consideration 
on the Mica2 motes to verify that the application indeed 
behaves as examined earlier.  
One question which arises here is why did, we employ 
Mica2 motes, when resource enriched next generation motes 
like Intel iMote [12], Crossbow Iris motes [78]  and 
Moteiv’s Tmote Sky motes [79] are available, today. Well, 
these motes indeed have higher computational and storage 
power. However, we believe that our evaluation that is 
carried out on more stringent environment of Mica2 motes, 
can always be true in more resource-rich environments. 
5.2 The Test Application 
For all of our evaluations we employ a simple application 
that comes bundled with the TinyOS environment viz. 
TestTinySec – the pseudocode shown in Fig. 5.  
Algorithm TestTinySec 
1. counter = timer 
2. while (counter == fired){ 
3. if (Send(Data Packet)) then LED=green 
4. else if( Receive(Data Packet)) 
then 
               LED=red 
   } 
Figure 5. The TestTinySec Algorithm 
 
Figure 6. TestTinySec application in TinySec 
 
The pseudocode of the application is as shown in the code 
snippet in Fig. 5 whereas its call-graph generated under the 
nesC compiler is shown in Fig. 6. TestTinySecM is the main 
module of the application. It uses a counter (which is part of 
the data packet sent/received over the radio) that is 
incremented on firing of a timer. 
TestTinySecM module also uses the TinyOS interfaces 
SendMsg and ReceiveMsg those are implemented by the 
component SecureGenericComm. SecureGenericComm is 
responsible for sending and receiving the secure messages 
over the radio. The counter value modified by the 
component Counter, is further passed by TestTinySecM (the 
suffix M here, as per the nesC conventions signifies the 
main module of the application) through the SendMsg 
interface of TinyOS, for onward transmission over the radio, 
to the component SecureGenericComm of TinyOS. In 
addition, when the message is sent, the Leds interface is 
used to toggle the LED on the mote. When the message is 
transmitted by a mote, the LED is turned green whereas, 
when the message is received by a mote, the LED is turned 
red. 
The module TinySecM.nc handles all the security related 
operations in TinySec. In Fig. 7, we show the partial call-
graph showing the security components of the TinySec that 
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come into play, during the execution. The call-graph was 
generated for the Skipjack cipher wired in the CBC mode 
that is the default configuration of TinySec. As can be seen, 
TinySecM.nc uses the modules CBCModeM.nc and 
CBCMAC.nc with appropriate calls to the default cipher 
component SkipJackM.nc to encrypt and decrypt the 
message and to generate and verify the MAC. Thus, 
SkipJackM, CBCMAC and CBCModeM components are not 
implemented by us.  
 
Figure 7. Partial Call-graph of the application with 
Skipjack in CBC Mode 
5.3 The  nesC Versions and Application Call-graphs  
As mentioned earlier, as part of its functionality, 
TinySecM.nc eventually calls the default cipher 
component SkipjackM.nc. In our experimentation, we 
replaced SkipJackM.nc with our own appropriate cipher 
components viz. TEAM.nc (for TEA), XTEAM.nc (for 
XTEA), XXTEAM.nc (for XXTEA), OXXTEAM.nc (for 
our own optimized XXTEA implementation), RC6M.nc 
(for our RC6 implementation), AESSPO.nc (for our own 
speed-optimized AES implementation) and AESSIO.nc 
(for our own size-optimized AES implementation).  
The 64-bit key for the Skipjack cipher in the default 
TinySec configuration, is stored in the ./tinyos-
keyfile. On the other hand, the ciphers of the TEA 
family are all 64-bit ciphers, using 128-bit key-size. Thus, 
we modified the ./tinyos-keyfile augmenting the 
keys in it. In addition, since the block cipher calls for 
encryption and for computation of the MAC are different 
calls, two sets of 128-bit keys are required to be stored in the 
key-file. Execution of these ciphers required modification of 
the key-size, cipher and mode contexts parameters in the 
TinySec header file, too. Apart from these files, we also 
modified the TinySec configuration files viz. 
TinySecM.nc, CBCMAC.nc and CBCModeM.nc,to 
lend the 128-bit key support.   
We also implement the nesC components for block cipher 
modes viz. the CCM (CCMM) and the OCB mode (OCBM) 
and the GCM (GCMM).  
We have tried to size-optimize the AES version inspired 
from the C-versions of AES in [80] and have tried to speed-
optimize the version of AES, inspired from the openSSL 
[59] version. We subsequently converted these into nesC.  
For the AES size-optimized cipher implementation 
(AESSIO) for our work, we are expending in only two 256-
byte wide entries in the F-table and S-table of AES [25]. We 
implement the rest of the computations required in AES, in 
the form of in-line functions and macros. Therefore, we 
expect that the throughput of this approach must be lower as 
compared to an approach in which the computations are 
reduced by expending more storage.   
In our AES speed-optimized version (AESSPO); we are 
using the AES small tables approach. In this approach, the 
intermediate values stored in the table are one 32-bit 256 
entry forward table and a reverse table each (1 KB + 1 KB) 
and a reverse S-Box (256 bytes). Thus, the total expended 
storage in this case is 2048 + 256 = 2304 bytes.  
Alternately, when employing AES large transformation 
tables, four forward and reverse tables each with 32-bit, 256 
entries are required (4 KB + 4 KB = 8192 B). Thus, the total 
increased expense in storage is 8192 – 2304 = 5888 B i.e. an 
increased storage overhead of 71%. For one round, this 
approach requires 16 table lookups and twelve 32-bit 
exclusive-OR operations, followed by four 32-bit exclusive-
OR operations in the AddRoundKey step.  
Comparing our size-optimized version with the speed- 
optimized version, we get a saving of 2304 -512 = 1792 
Bytes i.e. a percentage saving of 77.77%.  Such saving is 
indeed significant in the resource-starved environments in 
the sensor nodes.  
The relative comparison of our size and speed optimized 
versions of AES is shown in Table II. As we analyze in the 
next section , our theoretical evaluation as done above is 
actually reflected in the performance evaluation done by us. 
Table II  AES Optimizations 
Sr 
No 
Cipher  Storage Expended in 
Tables 
Total 
Storage 
1. AES Speed 
Optimized 
cipher 
32-bit 256 entries Forward 
computation table  
32-bit 256 entries Reverse 
computation table 
8-bit 256 entries S-box 
2304 bytes 
2. AES 
Storage 
Optimized 
version 
8-bit 256 entries Forward S-
Box 
8-bit 256 entries Reverse S-
Box 
512 bytes 
For XXTEA, we used the basic C-version in [26] and 
converted it into the nesC version. We also attempted 
optimizing the basic XXTEA operation using pre-computed 
tables and inline assembly code. We utilized tables for 
storing the value of DELTA (the magic constant) and round 
key generation for each round. We used the inline assembly 
code for the conversions viz. four-byte character ↔ long 
data type. We evaluate both the basic XXTEA cipher 
(XXTEA) and our own optimized XXTEA (XXTEAO). 
We subsequently modified the TinySec configuration files 
to execute the TestTinySec application using all the 
combinations of cipher and their modes of operation viz. 
AESSpeedOptrimized, AESSizeOptimized in the OCB, CCM 
and GCM modes and the Skipjack in the CBC mode. 
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In Fig. 8, we show the sample partial snapshots of the 
TestTinySec call-graph with XXTEA cipher in the CBC 
mode, whereas we show the partial call-graph of the 
application with AES cipher in the OCB mode in Fig. 9. 
In addition, since AES and RC6 are 128-bit ciphers as 
compared to the 64-bit Skipjack and XXTEA, we made 
appropriate logical changes in the TinySec files, for 
obtaining this support.  For XXTEA, RC6 and AES, we also 
changed the default tinyos-keyfile to enable the support for 
128-bit cipher keys.  
For the evaluation of our replay protection algorithms 
also, we use the same test application. 
  
 
Figure 8. Partial Call-graph of the application with 
XXTEA in CBC Mode 
 
 
Figure 9. Partial Call-graph of the application with AES 
in OCB Mode 
6. Results and Analysis 
In this section, we first show our experimental evaluation 
of the block cipher modes of operation, evaluation of ciphers 
and then the results for the anti-replay algorithm.  
6.1 Evaluation of the Block Cipher Modes 
We present the results of evaluations of the storage 
requirements (RAM and ROM), throughput in terms of 
bits/sec and the energy requirements for CBC, OCB, CCM, 
and GCM block cipher modes in the figures 10 to 13. We 
must emphasize that since we wanted to examine the 
advantages and suitability of the block cipher modes of 
operations, we used only a single cipher i.e. AES for 
evaluation of the cipher modes. The use of AES definitely 
yields improved security strength as compared to the 
TinySec default Skipjack cipher. We have used the Skipjack 
cipher in CBC mode as the reference for our comparison. 
Hence, it must be emphasized that without looking into any 
of the metrics, the fundamental advantage that we get using 
the AE modes is that the latter offer two security attributes 
as compared to the CBC mode that only offers 
confidentiality. 
From Fig. 10, for the MICA2 motes with only 4KB of 
RAM, we can see that an overhead of only 13.46% and 
12.98% results when using the OCB or CCM mode with the 
AES speed-optimized (AESSPO) and AES size-optimized 
(AESSIO) cipher implementations. 
 
Figure 10.  Increase (%) in RAM/ROM over the Skipjack 
in the CBC mode 
The same in case of GCM mode is substantially higher. 
This fact can be a critical factor in mode selection since 
RAM is scarce even in the recent next-generation motes. 
However, the significant advantage here is that with 
under 15% additional overhead in storage, both the 
attributes viz. confidentiality and authentication are 
obtained whereas with CBC mode only confidentiality is 
obtained.  
From Fig. 11 for the CPU cycles comparison, we can see 
that the CBC, OCB, CCM, GCM modes of operation require 
129.08%, 48.09% and 133.31% and 54.88% more CPU 
cycles respectively, when employing AES speed-optimized 
block cipher over the same with Skipjack cipher in CBC. 
The corresponding figures for the AES size-optimized 
version are similar. Thus, when employing OCB mode, the 
penalty in terms of increased CPU resources is much lesser 
as compared to the same, when employing CBC/CCM/GCM 
modes. 
In Fig. 12, we show the penalty in the form of lesser 
throughput when employing the AES cipher. Again, when 
employing our version of the AESSpeedOptimized in OCB, 
the percentage reduction in throughput is minimal, as 
compared to the CBC, CCM,  or GCM modes. 
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Figure 11. Increase (%) in CPU cycles over the Skipjack 
in CBC mode 
Figure 12. (%) Penalty in throughput with OCB/CCM 
(AES) over CBC (Skipjack) 
 
 
Figure 13. (%) Penalty in Energy consumption with 
OCB/CCM (AES) over CBC (Skipjack) 
This is a significant observation pointing to the fact that 
security due to 128-bit key strength with a stronger mode 
like OCB is obtained at much lesser overhead. Hence, the 
OCB mode should be the preferred mode of operation and 
not the CCM mode as in IEEE 802.15.4 standard 
specification – at least for the open source link layer security 
architecture, that we propose here.   
Energy is the most critical of all the resources in the 
WSNs. As can be seen from Fig. 13, the penalty in energy 
consumption in Mica2 motes for OCB/CCM/GCM modes 
employed in 128-bit key-size cipher, is much less as 
compared to the Skipjack cipher in CBC mode.  
Even with the increase in the CPU and storage resources 
in the next generation motes as was pointed out earlier, the 
energy availability for these motes has almost remained the 
same as the Mica2 motes.  Hence, our results indicating 
lesser penalty in energy consumption for OCB/CCM/GCM 
modes are even more significant and vital. 
We must again emphasize that the penalty when 
employing the AE modes, referred to above – whether in 
terms of the increased storage, or increased CPU cycles, 
reduced throughput, or increased energy consumption, is to 
be weighed in proper context. For, in return for the same, 
the underlying cryptosystem will offer two security attributes 
instead of a single one (when employing only CBC mode) 
and hence ultimately it results into overall reduction in 
overhead associated.   
6.2 Evaluation of the Block Ciphers 
In the figures 14-16, we show our results for the cipher 
evaluation. In Fig. 14, we show the storage requirements for 
the ciphers under consideration. We observed the RAM 
requirement of the cipher XXTEA and that of our own 
optimized XXTEA is the minimal- again which is a 
significant advantage because the size of RAM has not 
grown as significantly even in the next generation motes. 
 
 
Figure 14. RAM & ROM requirements for ciphers 
 
We also show the reduction in the ROM footprint that we 
were able to achieve in the XXTEAO, with the inline code 
and the pre-computation of the tables and delta values.  
In Fig. 15, we show the energy requirements of the 
ciphers estimated using the Avrora. From the observed 
energy requirements of the ciphers, the following points can 
be concluded: 
(a) As compared to Skipjack (80-bit key-size), the energy 
requirement of the 128-bit key-sized lightweight cipher 
XXTEAO (our own optimized XXTEA version) is only 
slightly higher.  
(b) The energy demands of AESSPO cipher is quite low, 
but it requires higher memory.   
Since energy constraints in motes are always severer, the 
XXTEA cipher gives the best of both the worlds – it 
requires lower memory, provides the security strength due to 
128-bit  
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Figure 15. Energy in Encryption/Decryption for ciphers 
 
Figure 16. Throughput of Cipher Operations 
key-size and demands lower energy resources as compared 
to other 128-bit key-sized ciphers like RC6 and AES.  
However, this also means that if the available resources 
permit, the security strength due to the AES standard can 
also be availed of, by using the speed optimized version of 
AES. 
Nevertheless, as is seen from the observations in Fig. 16, 
the throughput of XXTEA is the least. We are able to 
improve this in our own optimized version. However, in 
general the lesser throughput is due to the large number of 
rounds (32) involving combinations of rotations and 
exclusive OR operation.  
It may be noted that XXTEA is a cipher not having any 
substitution operation – it achieves the required non-
linearity through only the combinations of additions modulo 
232, rotations and ex-OR operations. While the designers of 
XXTEA proclaim having considered substitution also as one 
of the options, it is worthwhile (with increasing storage 
availability in motes) to investigate a combination of 
substitution and rotation based operations in XXTEA with 
lesser number of rounds, than present.  
Hence, depending upon the availability of the resources 
either of the XXTEA or the AES versions can be employed 
to attain the higher security strength – thus justifying the 
flexibility in selection of block ciphers. 
6.3 Evaluation of the Replay Protection Scheme 
Again, in order to evaluate the proposed Bloom filter 
based anti-replay scheme we use the same strategy and the 
same test application. We have evaluated the replay 
protection schemes based on different metrics viz. memory, 
energy and CPU cycles.  
We justify the lack of scalability in the Counter-based or 
Hash-based approaches from the RAM requirements with 
varying number of neighbors and fixed window-size (of 8). 
As the results in Fig. 17 show, the graph is almost linear as 
increasing the number of neighbors, increases the storage 
requirements, for maintaining the state of previously 
received counter values. We maintain the state in 2-byte 
counter in our counter based approach. In SHA-1 based 
approach we do so in a 20-byte message digest for all the 
neighbors. Hence it is clear that the memory requirement for 
SHA-1 based approach is higher than that for the counter 
based approach. We experienced that the counter based 
approach works for a maximum of 150 motes, whereas the 
SHA-1 based approach  
 
Figure 17. RAM requirements for Counter and Hash-based 
algorithms  
works for maximum 7 motes with fixed window size of 8. 
Therefore, these approaches lack the scalability as well as 
the performance desired.  
In Table III, we give a more meaningful and relative 
interpretation of the RAM requirements of all of our 
approaches, using TinySec without replay protection as the 
basis for comparing the percentage increase in RAM for all 
the approaches in a network with 10 nodes. It is clear from 
this table that Bloom filter based approach (with eight hash 
functions) requires less than 10% overhead in memory, as 
compared to TinySec without replay protection. Hence, it 
gives good performance.  
Table III. Percentage Increase in RAM for all approaches 
Method Description RAM 
usage 
(Bytes) 
% increase 
over 
TinySec 
TinySec without replay 
protection 
840 - 
Counter Based approach 1050 25 
Hash based approach 4958 489 
Bloom filter with 
multiple hash functions 
904 7.62 
FlexiSec: A Configurable Link Layer Security Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks          596 
The results obtained for the CPU cycle requirement of our 
implementation, using Avrora are as shown in Fig. 18. 
Again, the computational overhead for SHA-1 results in 
higher number of CPU cycles required for all SHA-1 based 
approaches.  
 
Figure 18. The CPU cycles usage for all approaches 
under evaluation 
The results for the energy requirements of our 
implementation are shown in a summarized form in Table 
IV, showing the percentage increase in the energy overhead 
for all approaches over TinySec without replay protection. It 
is clear from our results that our first and last approaches 
incur just 0.06% and 0.17% overhead in energy. As 
mentioned before, the counter based approach lacks 
scalability. Hence, the Bloom filter based approach offers 
the best of both worlds – demanding lesser energy and 
storage, being scalable and at the same time offering replay 
protection. Along with the lower false positive rate due to 
eight hash functions (equation 17), the Bloom filter based 
replay protection algorithm is most suitable. 
Table IV. Percentage  Increase in Energy Consumption for all 
approaches 
Method Description % increase 
in energy 
over TinySec 
TinySec without replay protection - 
Counter Based approach 0.06 % 
Hash based approach 4.14 % 
Bloom filter with single hash function 3.91 % 
Bloom filter with multiple hash 
functions 
0.17 % 
7. FlexiSec Architecture 
Based on the performance results and the analysis, we 
arrived at the FlexiSec architecture with the configurable 
alternatives therein shown in Table V. We propose to 
modify the TinyOS operating framework with the 
augmentation of the secure communications stack. Our 
design is unique in the fact we propose the secure 
communication stack to be configurable depending upon the 
data rate, level of security desired and the nature of the 
application (i.e. the security attributes desired).   
As can be observed from the table V, we propose nine 
different modes of operations. The modes we propose are 
based on the following observations from our performance 
results earlier: 
Observation 1. We propose that the OCB Authenticated-
Encryption block cipher mode of operation, be used for the 
security-sensitive applications in military, health and 
socioeconomic domains e.g. tracking the movement of an 
enemy troop OR monitoring the health parameters of a 
patient, OR in human security systems.  
In such applications, confidentiality of data is also vital 
along with authentication. Therefore, the applications by 
default, demand both these security attributes. When both 
the authentication as well as encryption operations are 
required, it is essential to use the AE modes of operations, in 
order to reduce the nos. of block cipher calls. As our results 
indicate, the usage of AE modes lends optimal storage, 
improved CPU utilization and lesser energy consumption.  
Since, OCB mode has been found to be the most energy 
efficient, we propose OCB as the designated AE mode of 
operation, instead of CCM or the NIST recommended 
GCM.  
However, for the typical environmental or habitat 
monitoring applications like tracking the movement of an 
animal in a sanctuary OR monitoring the amount of rainfall 
in the catchments areas of a river across a dam, to enable 
forecasting the probability of rainfall downstream; the 
confidentiality of data packets transmitted en route to the 
base station, is not essential. However, the data integrity, 
entity authentication, message freshness and replay 
protection are very vital for the same applications. Hence, 
the conventional CBC mode can still be employed here. 
Observation 2. Our results clearly indicate that the use of 
the AES standard ciphers entails penalty – either in the 
form of reduced speed or storage. On the other hand, 
lightweight cipher XXTEA, offers reasonable security due to 
its 128-bit key-size. Hence, for all the modes of operations 
in FlexiSec, we propose that either XXTEA or AES ciphers 
can be employed – depending upon the available resources 
and the application. 
Observation 3: Lastly, for different applications under 
consideration, the frequency of packets transmission also 
would vary.  The frequency of transmission of the data 
packets and the associated radio bandwidth has a very 
significant bearing on the number of bytes employed for the 
MAC.  Normally, for the WSNs, a  4-byte MAC is 
employed.  
However, it is essential to analyze whether a 4-byte MAC 
can be considered to be safe from attacks? With a 4-byte 
MAC an adversary would have 1 chance in 232 attempts, to 
forge the MAC.  Now, if the radio is operating at 19.2 kbps, 
as it is in case of CC1000 based MICA2 motes, one can 
send only about 40 forgery attempts per second, for the 68-
bytes sized TinyOS/TinySec packets. Therefore, in order to 
make 231 tries, the adversary will need at least 621 days to 
be able to try forging the MAC.  
From this discussion, we generalize the model for MAC- 
forging as explained below. If k is the size of the MAC in 
bits, P is size of the packet in bytes, W be the radio 
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bandwidth in bits per seconds and T be the time required by 
the adversary to successfully forge the MAC in number of 
days, then, T can be expressed as 
          
12 * *8
*3600*24
k PT
W
−
=                                 (19) 
Thus, this expression models the effort required by the 
adversary to carry out a cut-and-paste attack, based on the 
brute-force approach. We show the relation between T and 
the typical radio bandwidths in Fig. 19.  
As can be observed from the graph, if we assume the 
radio is operating at 250 kbps, then for the same 68-bytes 
sized packets, an adversary needs 52 days (as compared to 
621 days required with 19.2 kbps radio) of continuous 
packet transmission to forge the MAC. Therefore, the 
probability of a 4-byte MAC being forged by an adversary is 
higher than if higher MAC-sizes are used for the same. This 
is especially true in reference to the lifetime and the 
operating hours of the sensor nodes (left in the unattended 
environment) as shown in Fig. 20. 
Thus, high data rate applications would demand more bytes 
to be allocated for MAC as they would naturally require 
higher bandwidth. An example of applications that demand 
so is Smart Kindergarten, wherein a WSN is deployed   for   
monitoring   the   behavior   of   the   children and their 
movements with video streaming [82].  
Figure 19 MAC-forging Attack Scenario with a 4-byte MAC 
relative to Radio Bandwidth 
 
Figure 20  Lifetime of Typical Sensor Nodes [81] 
In fact [10] gives a detailed dissection of the applications 
of WSNs in object identification, detection & classification,  
single and multiple target tracking, collaborative signal & 
information processing etc. that all - demand higher 
bandwidth.  
In such applications, the volume of the data transferred as 
well as the frequency at which the data is transferred is 
high. Here, the probability of a 4-byte MAC being forged by 
an adversary operating with in the network is definitely 
higher than if an 8-byte MAC were employed.  
Hence, we propose variable MAC sizes, which the 
application designer using our communication architecture, 
can choose, configure and implement in the application, 
deployed; thereby optimizing the level and type of security. 
Eventually, given a choice of the MAC sizes, the application 
designer using FlexiSec, can choose, configure and 
implement the application using appropriate MAC sizes, 
thereby optimizing the level and type of security.  
Based on the above premises, we describe the modes of 
operations of FlexiSec briefly as below: 
Mode 1: The first option in the architecture is named as 
Null wherein it is assumed that because the security support 
is implemented in the hardware, the proposed security 
framework in the operating system does not include any 
security feature. This option can be used while employing 
the security enabled radio chips for the WSNs. 
Mode 2: The second one viz. FlexiSecHASH is proposed 
to offer the support only for message authentication – 
typically suited for the applications demanding only 
message integrity; without any demands for the entity 
authentication. Hence, we follow the un-keyed 
authentication technique i.e. hashing employing an 
algorithm like SHA-1. Any participating entity can check 
the authenticity of the message, irrespective of the keys 
employed or not.  
Mode 3: FlexiSecAUTH64 mode, the third mode, is 
intended to be employed for High Volume data and high 
data rate applications like PODS at Hawaii [83] OR Smart 
Sensors and Integrated Microsystems (SSIM) application 
[84] for Process control applications involving monitoring 
of machine parameters. Here, we intended to provide the 
support for 64 bits of MAC but without data encryption; 
because we believe confidentiality of data is not demanded 
here. This mode is suitable for the high data rate 
environmental monitoring applications, of the kind 
mentioned above.  
Mode 4: Similarly, the fourth option viz. 
FlexiSecAUTH32 offers authentication-only support for low 
data rate applications – with the provision of only 4 bytes of 
MAC. As mentioned earlier, the candidate applications are 
typically found in environmental control e.g. water-level 
monitoring, flood forecasting, stress monitoring in concrete 
structures etc.. In such applications, it is sufficient to sense 
and transmit only a few packets per day with only minimal 
parameter values. 
Modes 5 & 6: The fifth and the sixth options viz. 
FlexiSecAUTH_ENC64 and FlexiSecAUTH_ENC32 are the 
options to support data confidentiality apart from the 
FlexiSec: A Configurable Link Layer Security Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks          598 
message integrity using 8-byte MAC and 4-byte MAC 
respectively. These modes are useful in the applications 
requiring confidentiality e.g. in the military applications of 
the kind referenced before.  
Mode 7 & 8: The seventh and the eight modes in our 
proposed architecture are the FlexiSecAUTH_REPP64 and 
FlexiSecAUTH_REPP32 modes. These modes augment the 
security properties attained in the previous modes with that 
of replay protection. These modes could be employed for 
applications demanding message authentication as well as 
replay protection alone, without any encryption. Therefore, 
these modes are intended to employ CBC-MAC as the 
message authentication scheme.  
The last mode of operation viz. FlexiSec_ 
AUTH_ENC_REPP64 basically is intended to offer all the 
security attributes listed above with a message TAG MAC of 
8 bytes using the OCB mode again – could be employed in 
highly security-critical applications.  
Thus, the proposed architecture indeed offers flexibly 
configurable security attributes for the applications.  
Again, based on our performance results, we specify 
either XXTEA or AES cipher depending upon the 
availability of the resources. We also use the premise that if 
the application under consideration demands an 8-byte 
MAC, it must be implemented on the sensor node platform 
with higher resources. Therefore, we prescribe the AES 
cipher for the same. Otherwise the XXTEA cipher remains 
suitable.  
8. Conclusion  
The proposed flexible model of the link layer security 
architecture for the WSNs is useful in attaining the optimum 
performance in a deployed application. The resource 
optimization is possible because of the flexibility available 
in the hands of the application designer to select the specific 
security attributes as are demanded actually by the 
application. We believe that such a configurable link layer 
security architecture can always be useful in tuning the 
overhead associated with different WSN applications and 
thus make the entire system more responsive to the 
application environment. As compared to the peer link layer 
security architectures viz. TinySec, SenSec and MiniSec, in 
Table VI, we show the relative strengths of FlexiSec. 
Thus, the overall contribution of this research work is in 
augmenting the link layer security framework for the WSNs 
with the new concept of configurability. We have focused 
here on configurability with respect to the applications and 
the available resources with a fixed Mica2 hardware 
platform. As the applicability of the WSNs is moving out of 
the research labs into the real-world domains, the research 
explorations carried out here need be implemented for 
different platforms, too.  
In addition, we have used uniform global keying for key 
deployment and management. However, in order to support 
scalability in the real world applications, appropriate keying 
mechanism using the sophisticated keying mechanism based 
on either the SKC or PKC need to be devised as are 
described in [85].  
We believe that the time is ripe for incorporating sound 
security mechanisms in their implementations. Instead of 
discovering the limitations in the post-deployment 
implementations, it is better to impose the improvements in 
the designs and test them. We believe that the research 
findings attempted here will go a long way in achieving this 
objective.  
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Table V  FlexiSec modes of operations 
Cipher to be Employed 
Sr 
No Mode Identifier Description Low 
Storage/Energy 
Higher 
Storage/Energ
y 
1. Null Security support in hardware radio chip - - 
2. FlexiSecHASH Naïve Authentication Support with one-way hash function SHA-1 XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
3. FlexiSecAUTH64 64 bits - 8 bytes – MAC : only keyed 
authentication – CBCMAC XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
4. FlexiSecAUTH32 32 bits - 4 bytes – MAC : only keyed 
authentication – CBCMAC XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
5. FlexiSecAUTH_ENC64 8 bytes MAC and encryption – OCB (single pass) XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
6. FlexiSecAUTH_ENC32 4 bytes MAC and encryption – OCB (single pass) XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
7. FlexiSecAUTH_REPP64 8 bytes MAC: keyed authentication (CBCMAC) & replay protection XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
8. FlexiSecAUTH_REPP32 4 bytes MAC: keyed authentication (CBCMAC) & replay protection XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
9. FlexiSec_ AUTH_ENC_REPP64 
8 bytes MAC: keyed authentication (OCB), 
encryption & replay protection XXTEA cipher AES cipher 
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Table VI  FlexiSec Link Layer Security Framework vs. TinySec, SenSec, MiniSec Security Link Layer Frameworks 
Sr No Support for Link Layer Security Framework Features viz.  TinySec SenSec  MiniSec  FlexiSec 
1. Confidentiality? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2. Message/Entity Authentication? Yes No No Yes 
3. Authenticated Encryption? Conventional Conventional True  True 
4. Variable MAC-sizes No No No Yes 
5. Modular Design? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6. Replay Protection Algorithm? No No Yes Yes 
 (a)  Counter-based ? - - Yes Yes 
 (b)  SHA-1 based ? - - No Yes 
 (c)  Bloom-filter based ? - - Yes Yes 
7. Configurable? No No No Yes 
8. Hardware Platform? Mica2 Mica2 Telos Mica2 
9.  Underlying OS? TinyOS TinyOS TinyOS TinyOS 
 
